COGNITIVE DEBIASING INTERVENTION FOR ASSESSMENT OF PROLONGED GRIEF DISORDER by Aslanzadeh, M.S., Farah
Virginia Commonwealth University 
VCU Scholars Compass 
Theses and Dissertations Graduate School 
2021 
COGNITIVE DEBIASING INTERVENTION FOR ASSESSMENT OF 
PROLONGED GRIEF DISORDER 
Farah Aslanzadeh, M.S. 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd 
 
© The Author 
Downloaded from 
https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/6605 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars 













A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 





By: FARAH J. ASLANZADEH 







Director: Jared Keeley, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Psychology  
























I would like to extend my gratitude to my advisor and committee chair, Dr. Jared Keeley. 
Thank you for your valuable mentorship, guidance, and support. You have been an integral part 
of my success in graduate school, and I am so very grateful to have had your support and 
encouragement. 
I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Ashlee Loughan, Dr. Scott Vrana, 
Dr. Joshua Langberg and Dr. Sarah Kye Price. Thank you for giving your time, valuable 
feedback, and guidance during this process. I have very much appreciated integrating your 
perspectives and feedback into this project and having had the opportunity to improve upon my 
work.    
I would also like to thank all my colleagues and friends in the program that provided 
insight, support, and encouragement throughout this process. Rachel Wallace and Jackee 
Sadicario, I actually do not know what I would have done without you.  
Additionally, I would like to acknowledge the many individuals who have provided me 
with support and guidance outside of the program, especially my father, Jaber Aslanzadeh and 
my sister, Aryana Aslanzadeh. Without your love and support I could not have reached this 
special milestone. Thank for you for always believing in me.  
Finally, I would like to thank my partner, Braden Stocks. Thank you for joining me on 












































Clinical Judgment and Decision-Making……………………………………………….7 
Cognitive Debiasing……………………………………………….…………….………9 
Cognitive Errors in Diagnosis, Assessment, & Treatment of Bereavement Disorders…11 
Debiasing Strategies for Prolonged Grief Disorder…………………..…………………16 

















List of Tables 
 
Page 
Table 1.  Bereavement Related Disorders…………………………………………………54 
Table 2.  Sample Characteristics ………………………………………………………….55 
Table 3. Diagnostic Accuracy …………………………………………………………….57 
 

































By Farah J. Aslanzadeh, M.S. 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2021 
 
Major Director: Jared Keeley, Ph.D. 
Department of Psychology 
 
Cognitive debiasing is an approach to reducing diagnostic decision-making errors resulting from 
the misuse of cognitive heuristics and biases. This study built on prior research that has 
successfully used a multi-modal debiasing approach to reduce diagnostic errors. Clinicians were 
recruited and randomized into a general presentation on the changes in the stress and trauma 
section of ICD-11 (including the diagnostic criteria of prolonged grief disorder [PGD]) or the 
same general presentation plus and a cognitive debiasing intervention for PGD. All clinicians 
were then asked to diagnose three patient vignettes in which biases/potential decision-making 
errors were embedded in the text. Results revealed nonsignificant effects of the intervention on 
diagnostic accuracy. These findings may be related to an underpowered sample, inadequate bias 
activation, and a ceiling effect. More research is needed to improve upon the methodological 
limitations of the current study and to optimize potential benefits for clinicians working with the 
bereaved. 
Key words: debiasing, prolonged grief disorder, decision-making errors
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Cognitive Debiasing Intervention for Assessment of Prolonged Grief Disorder 
Despite a long history of treating bereaved individuals and non-normative bereavement 
responses with psychotherapy, it is only with the development of the fifth edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association; APA, 2013) that 
a diagnosis encompassing impairing, persistent patterns of grief was included in the diagnostic 
manual most commonly used among mental health professionals in the United States (First et al., 
2018) and a similar disorder has been proposed for international use in the International 
Classification of Disease (ICD-11; Maercker et al., 2013). While most bereaved individuals 
struggle but ultimately cope with loss, others experience abnormally elevated distress that causes 
significant impairment for an atypically prolonged period of time following a loss. This non-
normative experience is described as persistent complex bereavement disorder (PCBD) or 
prolonged grief disorder (PGD). Despite beliefs that the vast majority of bereaved individuals do 
not experience seriously adverse grief reactions, a recent meta-analysis demonstrated variable 
prevalence rates across 14 identified studies with 9.8% - 11.0% of bereaved individuals 
experiencing symptoms consistent with PGD (Lundorff, Holmgren, Zachariae, Farver-
Vestergaard, & O’Connor, 2017). However, PCBD and PGD remain diagnoses in need of further 
research, with the field only recently working to come to agreement on criteria to understand 
adverse bereavement reactions. Given the various conceptualizations of non-normative grief (i.e., 
prolonged grief, pathological grief, complicated grief, persistent complex bereavement disorder), 
it is reasonable to expect that clinicians may have differing thresholds for what they consider to 
be disordered grief, dictating who does and does not receive intervention.  
In addition to utilizing diagnostic manuals and published criteria, clinicians often rely on 
their clinical judgment in order to make decisions about the appropriateness of a certain 
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diagnosis or treatment option. While able to assist in making accurate and efficacious 
determinations, clinical judgment can fall prey to a number of decision-making errors as a result 
of the misuse of schema-based knowledge, cognitive heuristics, or the development of biases in 
thinking. There is a large body of literature that illustrates the impact of decision-making errors 
on diagnosis and treatment decisions (Garb, 1998; Saposnik, Redelmeier, Ruff, & Tobler, 2016). 
While the field of medicine has used research on the sources of decision-making errors to reduce 
their effects (Croskerry, Singhal, Mamede, 2013), much less time has been dedicated to research 
that seeks to illuminate the ways mental health professionals can combat decision-making errors 
in their own work. A recent review was only able to identify 12 studies that examined the effects 
of debiasing interventions for mental health professionals (Aslanzadeh, Kleva, Headley, & 
Keeley, in preparation), while recent reviews of debiasing interventions for medical health 
professionals included 28 - 68 manuscripts (Graber, et al., 2012; Lambe et al., 2016; Ludolph & 
Schulz, 2018). 
 One of the few manuscripts detailing an effective debiasing intervention for mental health 
professionals was a study conducted by Jenkins and Youngstrom (2016) with the aim of 
improving diagnostic accuracy and treatment decisions in pediatric bipolar disorder (PBD). This 
study constructed their intervention by identifying common sources of error when diagnosing 
and treating PBD. By first isolating these common issues and the decision-making processes 
likely driving these errors, they then used literature on methods to reduce decision-making errors 
to construct an educational module providing information on common errors and strategies to 
reduce them in the diagnosis and treatment of PBD. By considering the underlying issues 
inherent in the diagnosis and treatment of PBD, Jenkins and Youngstrom created an intervention 
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with large effects (d = 1.67) in improving overall diagnostic accuracy, significantly 
outperforming a simple presentation of PBD criteria.  
 Given the historically disjointed field of bereavement related disorders, the present study 
aims to improve diagnosis and treatment decision-making by improving knowledge of and 
reducing effects of common cognitive errors which impact diagnosis and treatment of PGD. We 
assessed the success of implementing a debiasing intervention similar to the disorder specific 
approach designed by Jenkins and Youngstrom (2016) for PBD. After assessing the literature for 
common sources of diagnostic and treatment errors in PGD, we identified corresponding 
strategies which we hypothesized would reduce the incidence of decision-making errors and 
improve diagnostic accuracy.  
Literature Review 
Bereavement-Related Disorders 
 Diagnosing bereavement-related psychopathology has been a challenging task, in large 
part due to the historical lack of guidelines for diagnosis and treatment. Despite coping with grief 
and loss being popular topics in the field of mental health, prior to the publication of the DSM-5 
bereavement related disorders were not included in the diagnostic manual. Previous editions of 
the DSM had tried to avoid unnecessarily pathologizing grief by keeping it out of the 
classification system, citing the need for additional research before designating a diagnosis for 
bereavement related distress (Shear et al., 2011).  
In the absence of a unifying diagnostic construct, a number of conceptualizations of 
bereavement-related psychopathology were proposed in the literature such as complicated grief 
(Horowitz et al., 1997), traumatic grief (Prigerson et al., 1999), and prolonged grief disorder 
(Prigerson et al., 2009). Complicated grief (CG) and PGD have persisted as the most commonly 
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used terms among researchers, with DSM-5 integrating aspects of PGD and CG to create PCBD. 
Meanwhile, the ICD-11 plans to include a version of PGD (Maercker et al., 2013). Interestingly, 
research has shown PCBD and PGD to be distinct from symptoms of depression, anxiety, and 
stress-related disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Maciejewski, Maercker, 
Boelen, & Prigerson, 2016), but not distinct constructs themselves. When looking across the 
most recently published diagnostic criteria for CG (Shear et al., 2011), PGD (Prigerson et al., 
2009), PCBD (APA, 2013), and PGD for ICD-11 (Maercker et al., 2013), there are notable 
commonalities with some slight differences (see Table 1 for a summary). 
There are several symptoms that are common across all the aforementioned diagnostic 
criteria including: yearning/longing, sorrow/emotional pain, preoccupation with the deceased, 
difficulty accepting the death, emotional numbness/being stunned, and bitterness/anger 
(Nakajima, 2018). When looking at differences across diagnoses, each diagnosis has a different 
time-related criterion. CG cannot be diagnosed until the individual has been bereaved for at least 
six months and has symptom duration for at least one month (Shear et al., 2011). Prigerson and 
colleagues’ (2009) proposed duration of six months (PGD) is shared in the ICD-11 proposed 
PGD diagnosis (Maercker et al., 2013). The duration criterion for PCBD (APA, 2013) is the 
most restrictive at 12 months required for diagnosis.  
Each diagnosis has several symptoms that are unique to its conceptualization of 
disordered reactions to bereavement. CG defines pathological grief as when “complications 
derail or impede healing after loss and lead to a period of prolonged and intensified acute grief” 
(Shear, 2011, p. 105) and has by far the greatest number of possible symptoms. In addition to the 
previously mentioned shared symptoms across disorder definitions (e.g., yearning, longing, 
preoccupation with the deceased), CG criteria include a preoccupation with the circumstances of 
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the death; difficulty in positively reminiscing; self-blame and other maladaptive cognitive 
appraisal; avoidance of reminders; desire to die (suicidal ideation); difficulty trusting others; 
loneliness; considering life as empty, meaningless and unfulfilling; difficulty caring for others; 
envious of others who have not faced a loss; experiencing symptoms of the deceased; hearing or 
seeing the deceased; excessive proximity seeking; intense emotional/physiological reactivity to 
memories/reminders; and disturbing emotional/physiological reactivity to reminders.  
Prigerson and colleagues’ PGD criteria focus much less on characterizing the 
circumstances of the bereavement, instead focusing on the symptoms accompanying 
bereavement and separation distress (i.e., yearning/longing for the deceased).  Additional 
symptoms include avoidance of reminders; difficulty trusting others; considering life as empty, 
meaningless and unfulfilling; confusion regarding self-identity/feeling that part of yourself died; 
and difficulty moving on. Interestingly, proposed criteria for ICD-11 PGD (Maercker et al., 
2013) keep the concept of separation distress, symptoms of confusion regarding self-identity/part 
of yourself died, and difficulty moving on, dropping avoidance of reminders, difficulty trusting 
others, and considering life as empty, meaningless and unfulfilling, while adding difficulty 
positively reminiscing as well as self-blame and other maladaptive cognitive appraisals.  
Finally, PCBD (APA, 2013) as proposed, appears to be an integration of CG and PGD. In 
addition to the shared concept of separation distress and other shared reactive symptoms 
previously mentioned, PCBD includes preoccupation with the circumstances of the death (CG); 
difficulty positively reminiscing (PGD, ICD-11); self- blame and other maladaptive cognitive 
appraisal (CG/PGD, ICD-11); avoidance of reminders (CG/PGD); desire to die (CG); difficulty 
trusting others (CG/PGD); loneliness (CG); considering life as empty, meaningless and 
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unfulfilling (CG); confusion regarding self-identity/part of yourself died (PGD/PGD, ICD-11); 
and difficulty moving on (PGD/PGD, ICD-11). 
 In addition to evaluating if a patient meets criteria for a diagnosis of PGD or PCBD, 
clinicians must also consider the possibility that the person’s symptoms are better explained by 
an alternative diagnosis. While research has shown bereavement related disorders to be distinct 
(Maciejewski et al., 2016), they do share similar symptom presentations to other disorders and 
are not the only disorders that can present following a loss. Differential diagnoses such as 
chronic depression, major depressive episode, posttraumatic stress disorder, and normative grief 
responses are among the many other diagnoses important to consider.  
 When differentiating between general depression and grief-related distress, Jordan and 
Litz (2014) encourage clinicians to consider the extent the individual’s despair is directly related 
to their separation from their loved one rather than a general depressive mood. Previous research, 
which has looked at the trajectory of depressive symptoms predating loss, at bereavement, and 
across a period of 18 months post-bereavement has shown that there are variable trajectories of 
post-bereavement depression (Bonanno, 2004), with some depressive states occurring within the 
context of pre-bereavement depressive symptoms and being independent of bereavement (i.e., 
chronic low depression, chronic major depression). Jordan and Litz (2014) also point out several 
distinguishing characteristics of prolonged grief disorder including: absence of global 
guilt/worthlessness in PGD, loss of interest accompanied by beliefs that being reunited with the 
deceased would eliminate distress, and difficulty trusting others/loss of meaning without the 
deceased. Further information regarding diagnosing PGD within the context of a major 
depressive episode (MDE) will be included later in the document. 
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 Clinicians may also need to consider that the manner in which loss was experienced has 
made the bereaved person vulnerable to development of PTSD. Despite avoidance of external 
and internal reminders of the deceased being a shared characteristic of PGD and PTSD, the 
emotional profiles are distinct between these two disorders (Jordan & Litz, 2014). While PTSD’s 
emotional profile typically includes feelings of fear, anxiety, shame, and guilt, PGD is more 
likely to include feelings of yearning, loss, and emptiness. Feelings of numbness may be a 
common shared symptom between the two diagnoses, and it remains important to remember that 
comorbidity is not uncommon with PGD (Simon et al., 2007).  
Another likely explanation for a patient’s presenting distress is normal grief. One of the 
central features of non-normative bereavement reactions is the persistent change in functioning 
and continued desire and yearning for the lost loved one. As previously mentioned, research that 
has looked at the trajectory of bereavement-related distress found that about 45% of their sample 
experienced low rates of depressive symptoms and bereavement-related symptoms largely 
resolved by 18 months (Bonanno, 2004). Given that the majority of participants did not develop 
adverse grief reactions, it is important to consider the nature of the distress and timeline in order 
to evaluate the likelihood of non-normative bereavement distress.  
Clinical Judgment and Decision-Making 
Given the multiple conceptualizations of non-normative grief in the literature and the 
various differential diagnoses to consider, it is important to examine the role of clinical judgment 
and the underlying mechanisms that dictate that process. Much of what clinicians do involves 
interpreting and making predictions based on their clients’ behavior (e.g., probable diagnosis, 
risk for suicide, treatment response), requiring them to use their clinical judgment, an informal 
and intuitive decision-making process (Ægisdóttir et al., 2006). The greater literature on 
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decision-making suggests that people engage in two types of cognitive processes when making 
decisions. This is known as the dual processing system and includes a quick, automatic, 
heuristic-based approach (System 1) and a purposeful, deliberate, slower process (System 2) (for 
a review see Evans, 2008). Since clinical judgment relies on the clinician’s informal, intuitive 
decision-making process, it is heavily influenced by cognitive heuristics or shortcuts, such as 
availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), and vulnerable to the development of error. For this reason, it is particularly 
important to develop and implement methods to optimize the accuracy of clinical judgment, 
through debiasing the cognitive decision-making process to the greatest extent possible. 
For example, a clinician may be misled by their conceptualization of a diagnostic 
“prototype” (i.e., representativeness) or the cases they have most often seen in the past or can 
easily recall (i.e., availability).  If a clinician is working on a psychiatric inpatient unit, their 
repeated exposure to patients with psychosis is likely to have resulted in a diagnostic prototype 
for schizophrenia. If a patient with an atypical presentation or prodromal symptoms does not 
match this prototype, the clinician may be at risk for missing the correct diagnosis as a result of 
the representativeness heuristic. Conversely, if the same clinician has commonly and even 
recently seen a presentation very similar to the patient’s, they might prematurely give a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia due to the availability heuristic, without ruling out other relevant diagnostic 
differentials (e.g., intoxication, delirium). One can also apply this type of thinking error to 
diagnosing and treating the bereaved. If a recently bereaved patient presents for care and does 
not meet that clinician’s understanding of—or “prototypical” representation of—PGD, they are 
much less likely to select that diagnosis. Similarly, clinicians are more likely to use previous 
learning, such as their “representation” of disorders, in order to make a determination about 
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likely diagnosis. In order to successfully debias this decision-making process, clinicians must 
first be aware of a possible bias, be motivated to correct it, understand the way bias is 
influencing their decision, and be able to successfully implement a debiasing strategy in order to 
avoid biased decision-making (Croskerry, 2005). While seemingly straightforward, failure at any 
of these levels can result in distorted clinical judgment and biased decision-making.  
Cognitive Debiasing 
 Despite a robust body of literature demonstrating the effect of various cognitive errors on 
the clinical decision-making of mental health professionals, far less research has focused on the 
remediation of these maladaptive processes (Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & Landfield, 2009). While 
medical professionals have incorporated what has been learned about bias in decision-making to 
improve decision-making through a number of internal and external strategies (Croskerry et al., 
2013; Graber, et al., 2012; Lambe, O’Reilly, Kelly, & Curristan, 2016; Ludolph & Schulz, 
2018), this adoption has not been seen among mental health professionals.  
In addition to researchers less frequently investigating debiasing strategies with mental 
health professionals, the field has remained rather disjointed, with early research testing the 
effects of individual debiasing strategies on individual biases rather than targeting the underlying 
mechanisms of biased decision-making (Aczel, Bago, Szollosi, Foldes, & Lukacs, 2015). While 
organizational systems have been proposed to better understand these errors and inform potential 
debiasing strategies (Arkes, 1991; Larrick, 2004), these groupings remain inconsistently used. 
When one does characterize the limited research that has been done with mental health 
professionals, it has largely centered on aspects of cognitive debiasing. Cognitive debiasing 
refers to the use of cognitive strategies to counter the effects of misused cognitive heuristics or 
biases. Some cognitive strategies that have been assessed with mental health professionals 
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include awareness building (Friedlander & Philips, 1984; Parmley, 2006), listing reasons in 
support of all possible diagnoses (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988), considering the 
opposite and taking notes (Mumma & Wilson, 1995), training in diagnostic coding (Rezvyy, 
Parniakov, Fedulova, & Oldstad, 2008), feedback (Haderlie, 2011; Wood & Tracey, 2009) and 
training in statistical concepts (Jefferies-Sewell, 2015).  
 One randomized controlled trial successfully reduced bias and cognitive errors in the 
diagnosis and treatment decision-making of mental health professionals by providing education 
on common cognitive pitfalls and debiasing strategies for PBD (Jenkins & Youngstrom, 2016). 
Researchers first identified several common errors in the diagnosis and treatment of PBD: base 
rate neglect, search satisfying, diagnostic momentum, and race and ethnicity bias. They then 
constructed vignettes that included these pitfalls and used a multidimensional approach for their 
debiasing intervention. Participants were mental health professionals (N = 137), recruited with 
study fliers, listserv announcements, and by word-of-mouth. All study materials and measures 
were administered on Qualtrics, a web-based survey platform (Qualtrics, 2014). After being 
screened for inclusion and eligibility, Qualtrics automatically randomized participants into the 
control (n = 81) or treatment group (n = 56). Both groups were then directed to an automated, 
narrated PowerPoint presentation, the control group viewing a brief presentation on PBD, while 
the treatment condition viewed the brief presentation on PBD and the cognitive debiasing 
intervention. The debiasing intervention was comprised of two sections: the first provided 
education on common cognitive pitfalls in the assessment of PBD (i.e., base rate neglect, search 
satisfying, diagnostic momentum, and race and ethnicity bias) and the second tools to avoid 
them, such as utilizing symptom checklists, considering alternative explanations, engaging in 
metacognition or reflecting on one’s thinking process, decreasing reliance on memory, and using 
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simulation for practice. Following the presentations, all participants reviewed four vignettes and 
were asked to (a) select a probable diagnosis and (b) recommend the next clinical action (e.g., 
additional assessment, psychotherapy, medication, no treatment, and other). Participants were 
also given the opportunity to indicate any additional diagnoses they were considering, which 
allowed researchers to assess differential diagnosis processes. When compared to the group of 
clinicians who only received a brief presentation on PBD, clinicians in the debiasing intervention 
outperformed controls on overall diagnostic accuracy (d = 1.67), sensitivity to possible 
hypomania or mania, detecting co-morbid conditions, and reducing diagnostic momentum.  
One of the strengths of this debiasing intervention was its multi-level targeted approach. 
Croskerry et al. (2013) wrote that in order for successful debiasing to take place, certain steps are 
necessary or the risk for distorted clinical reasoning increases. When a bias is triggered, the 
decision-maker must be aware, motivated to correct the bias, aware of the direction and 
magnitude of the bias, and have the ability to use an appropriate debiasing strategy.  Jenkins and 
Youngstrom’s (2016) debiasing intervention used multiple steps within this model by building 
awareness of common cognitive pitfalls, providing information on how these pitfalls commonly 
affect diagnosis and treatment decisions in PBD, and finally by providing appropriate debiasing 
strategies to optimize decision-making. It is for this reason that we predict this method is 
superior to awareness building or strategy training in isolation. Thus, we used this methodology 
to inform our own debiasing intervention for bereavement-related disorder diagnosis and 
treatment planning. 
Cognitive Errors in Diagnosis, Assessment, and Treatment of Bereavement Disorders   
Given the lack of agreement in the field on a formal definition of and criteria for non-
normative bereavement related distress, it is not surprising that clinicians have a number of 
 
 12 
challenges in diagnosing, assessing, and treating bereaved individuals. The inclusion of PCBD in 
the DSM-5 under “conditions for further study” communicated that, while evidence exists that 
supports its inclusion, additional research is needed in order to ascertain the distinguishing 
criteria of the disorder (Bryant, 2013). Notably, the DSM-5 workgroup did not adopt a singular 
proposed definition [see Prigerson et al. (2009) or Shear et al. (2011)] in its entirety, instead 
integrating aspects of both and requesting further research to identify the essential features of the 
diagnosis (e.g., yearning).  
One of the biggest concerns of the workgroup and larger field of mental health was that 
the inclusion of a bereavement related disorder in the diagnostic manual had the potential to lead 
to the unnecessary pathologizing of normative bereavement reactions and the bereaved. Since 
bereavement is a common and generally inevitable part of the human experience, the field has 
been hesitant to prematurely include a bereavement related disorder in part due to a reasonable 
fear of repeating a pattern of historical offenses of pathologizing normative reactions, responses, 
and experiences (e.g., “drapetomania,” “homosexuality”). In fact, the DSM-III and DSM-IV 
criteria for major depressive disorder (MDD) went so far as to include a bereavement exclusion 
(BE) to avoid pathologizing this common life experience, as many depressive symptoms (e.g., 
depressed mood, loss of appetite, crying, loss of interest) are associated with normative 
bereavement and remit without need for intervention (Clayton, Desmarais, & Winokur, 1968). 
This precluded bereaved individuals from being diagnosed with MDD if they met the following 
criteria: (1) no psychotic ideation; (2) duration of no more than 2 months, by which point it must 
remit; (3) does not cause severe impairment in role functioning; (4) no suicidal ideation; (5) no 
psychomotor retardation (i.e., no general and observable slowing down of thought and 
movement); and (6) the bereaved individual must not suffer from a morbid preoccupation with 
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his or her worthlessness as a human being. If so, this would designate their experience and 
symptom presentation as a normative grief response, making it an “uncomplicated” bereavement 
as opposed to a “complicated” case where one of the above criteria were met and the bereaved 
individual was able to be given a diagnosis of MDD.  
However, these exclusionary criteria were challenged with the release of DSM-5, with 
researchers citing mixed information about the relationship between MDD and stressful and/or 
difficult life events such as bereavement. (Wakefield & First, 2012). Wakefield, Schitz, First, 
and Horwitz (2007) assessed the appropriateness of extending the uncomplicated/complicated 
distinction to include non-bereavement stressors. Their findings provided support for extending 
the BE to further distinguish between complicated and uncomplicated responses to common 
stressors and reduce the diagnosis of MDD in cases of normative reactions. Additional research 
confirmed the lack of differences between bereavement and other stressor-induced depression 
(Kendler, Myers, Zisook, 2008) as well as the lack of variance in MDD presentation as a 
function of general psychosocial factors (Kendler, Myers, & Halberstadt, 2010).  
Ultimately, during the revision process for the DSM-5 it was asserted that the BE would 
either need to be extended to include other life stressors or removed. Lack of support for 
extending the BE to include other life stressors led to it being excluded from DSM-5. However, 
given the mixed literature, the concept continues to be a confound for clinicians trying to 
differentiate between normal grief response, non-normative grief response, and depression. 
Indeed, pushback and concerns about the BE’s removal prompted an expanded footnote to be 
included with the diagnostic criteria for MDD (see below). 
In distinguishing grief from a major depressive episode (MDE), it is useful to consider 
that in grief the predominant affect is feelings of emptiness and loss, while in MDE it is 
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persistent depressed mood and the inability to anticipate happiness or pleasure. The 
dysphoria in grief is likely to decrease in intensity over days to weeks and occurs in 
waves, the so-called pangs of grief. These waves tend to be associated with thoughts or 
reminders of the deceased. The depressed mood of MDE is more persistent and not tied 
to specific thoughts or preoccupations. The pain of grief may be accompanied by positive 
emotions and humor that are uncharacteristic of the pervasive unhappiness and misery 
characteristic of MDE. The thought content associated with grief generally features a 
preoccupation with thoughts and memories of the deceased, rather than the self-critical or 
pessimistic ruminations seen in MDE. In grief, self-esteem is generally preserved, 
whereas in MDE feelings of worthlessness and self-loathing are common. If self-
derogatory ideation is present in grief, it typically involves perceived failings vis-à-vis 
the deceased (e.g., not visiting frequently enough, not telling the deceased how much he 
or she was loved). If a bereaved individual thinks about death and dying, such thoughts 
are generally focused on the deceased and possibly about "joining" the deceased, whereas 
in MDE such thoughts are focused on ending one's own life because of feeling worthless, 
undeserving of life, or unable to cope with the pain of depression (APA, 2013, p. 161). 
While helpful in highlighting the cardinal features of a MDE and describing differences 
with grief, the note gives little clarification regarding the validity of the bereavement exclusion 
or guidance for clinicians’ differentiating between uncomplicated reactions to adverse life events 
and complicated reactions (i.e., non-normative grief reactions). These qualifiers indeed represent 
different views in the field. While clinical judgment is an important part of diagnosis and clinical 
practice, there are many examples of how clinician level variables impact clinical judgment, 
leading to variability in diagnoses (Berman, Stark, Cooperman, Wilhelm, & Cohen, 2015; 
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Ganzach, 2000; Neighbors, Trierweiler, Ford, & Muroff, 2003; Olbert, Nagendra, & Buck, 
2018). When giving agency to the provider to determine if their patient’s psychopathology is 
better understood as uncomplicated/normative bereavement, complicated/non-normative 
bereavement, or MDD, it remains difficult to minimize the possibility for an attribution error. 
Clinician level bias or heuristics may lead to variability in diagnostic thresholds, or inappropriate 
attribution of symptoms of MDD to a recent loss, or the opposite, symptoms of a true major 
depressive episode to non-normative or normative grief.  
Moreover, clinicians’ familiarity with other types of psychopathology, may overshadow 
symptoms of non-normative bereavement. It is not surprising that differential diagnosis may be 
challenging or entirely overlooked in bereaved individuals, given the exclusion of a non-
normative bereavement disorder in the main text of the DSM and as well as existing work that 
has conceptualized non-normative bereavement as including a pattern of avoidance similar to 
that seen in PTSD and MDD (Boelen, & Eisma, 2015; Boelen, van de Schoot, van den Hout, de 
Keijser, & van den Bout, 2010). Further, clinicians repeated exposure to patients diagnosed with 
MDD, adjustment disorders, or PTSD may result in an availability bias where clinicians think of 
their most recent or easily accessible case examples for comparison rather than evaluating for 
bereavement related distress. This may be particularly difficult to override, when considering the 
variable number of bereaved individuals that may be seen by a given clinician.  
Further, due to the commonality of bereavement, established beliefs, misconceptions, and 
heuristics about the normative bereavement process are regularly applied to conceptualizing and 
treating non-normative grief reactions. We can look to the literature for a number of examples of 
misconceptions of “healthy” or “normal” grieving experiences or processes. For example, while 
individuals often describe engaging in “grief work” or “working through” a loss, there is no 
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evidence that this process is necessary for the reduction of distress in bereaved individuals 
(Wortman & Silver, 1989). However, it remains a commonly used and referenced strategy for 
reducing emotional distress among the bereaved (Stroebe & Schut, 1999). It is possible that 
inferences about the necessity of engaging in “grief work” or working through the “stages of 
grief” (Kübler-Ross, 1969), may result in treatment or diagnostic decisions led by the 
representative heuristic, or clinicians’ prototypical view of non-normative grief. Existing 
heuristics of normative bereavement responses may lead clinicians to overlook cultural or 
identity-related factors that may alter the individual’s presentation of normative or non-
normative bereavement reactions.   
Disenfranchised grief is an example of how individual level variables, circumstances of 
the loss, and relationship with the deceased can impact the recognition of certain bereaved 
populations. When individuals do not meet the socially understood framework of a person who 
could grieve a loss, they may be less likely to be recognized as needing assistance with their 
bereavement process (Doka, 1989). Bereaved sexual- and gender-minority spouses or partners 
(Bristowe, Marshall, & Harding, 2016), parents bereaved by miscarriage or pregnancy loss (Lang 
et al., 2011), persons bereaved by suicide (Logan, Thornton, & Breen, 2018), health care 
providers (Carton & Hupcey, 2014), bereaved ex-spouses (Tullis, 2017), and bereaved pet 
owners (Cordaro, 2012) may be susceptible to the effects of disenfranchised grief. Existing 
beliefs and heuristics about who can grieve and what circumstances constitute a loss may lead to 
inaccurate assumptions regarding the validity of bereaved related distress. 
Debiasing Strategies for Prolonged Grief Disorder 
While debiasing has been under-researched (Lilienfeld et al., 2009) and most of the 
available research has centered on counteracting specific biases or misused heuristics 
 
 17 
independent of a particular diagnosis (Aczel et al., 2015), multi-modal debiasing interventions, 
such as Jenkins and Youngstrom’s (2016) cognitive debiasing intervention for PBD, have been 
shown to be successful in reducing multiple errors and enhancing diagnostic accuracy. The 
essential elements of their model included first building awareness of common cognitive pitfalls, 
providing information on how these pitfalls commonly affect diagnosis and treatment decisions 
in that given diagnosis, and offering appropriate debiasing strategies to optimize decision-
making. 
As previously stated, there are a number of cognitive errors that can interfere with 
diagnosis and treatment of non-normative grief reactions. Given the international reach of the 
ICD (First et al., 2018), as well as the small amount of available research assessing PCBD (64 
articles available on PsycINFO as of March 1, 2021), this paper focused on the PGD criteria 
proposed for ICD-11. When considering some of the difficulties associated with diagnosing and 
treating the bereaved, the overlap between normative grief, non-normative grief, and MDD has 
been a highly debated topic. As previously stated, after removing the BE from DSM-5, a 
footnote was added to allow room for clinicians to use their clinical judgment regarding the 
exclusion of the bereaved from a diagnosis of MDD. The footnote distinguishes between some 
key differences in thought content, emotional states, and course between a MDE and grief, but 
says little about the distinguishing features of non-normative grief and MDE. Given the lack of 
consensus and difficulty disentangling bereavement and depression, cognitive strategies would 
be an appropriate intervention to assist clinicians trying to optimize their decision-making when 
considering a diagnosis of MDD, PGD, or normative grief. Clinicians would benefit from 
knowledge of the existing diagnostic features of each of the disorders, as previous research has 
shown training in diagnostic coding to be an effective intervention for tempering diagnostic 
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errors (Rezvyy et al., 2008). In addition, more regularly used diagnoses may be more “available” 
or easily called to mind when evaluating a bereaved patient. One way to avoid conflating the 
most probable option and the option that is most easily called to mind is to slow down the 
automatic process of availability by evaluating the information provided objectively and 
systematically. This can be facilitated by engaging in a simple process, such as listing reasons for 
and against a diagnosis. Alternatively, a clinician could “considering the opposite” and evaluate 
the available information under the premise that their initial diagnosis is wrong or assessing the 
information’s fit with a competing diagnosis (Arkes et al., 1988; Koriat, et al., 1980; Lord et al., 
1984). This may be especially helpful in the case of differentiating between MDD, PGD, and 
normative bereavement given the context of the bereavement exclusion. 
Furthermore, in the absence of empirical evidence, cultural beliefs and folklore related to 
the normative bereavement process may lead to the development of heuristics regarding 
bereavement and grief which may guide decision-making processes. In particular, decisions 
regarding the appropriateness of bereavement responses may be informed by a clinician’s prior 
experiences that have resulted in a representativeness bias (or clinicians’ prototypical view of 
non-normative grief). As previously referenced, beliefs regarding who can be considered 
bereaved and experience grief may disproportionately impact disenfranchised grievers or those 
with reactions in contrast to clinicians’ representativeness heuristic. Similarly, over 
pathologizing may also impact diagnostic practices among the bereaved (Ganzach, 2000; 
Ganzach, 1997; Meyer & Meyer, 2009). When attempting to reduce the effects of a 
representativeness heuristic, cognitive strategies such as listing reasons for and against a 
diagnosis have been shown to be helpful in evaluating the symptoms present in a more objective 
manner (Arkes et al., 1988; Koriat, et al., 1980; Lord et al., 1984). Mnemonic devices may also 
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assist providers by reducing reliance on memory to recall important diagnostic criteria (Jenkins 
& Youngstrom, 2016). 
The Present Study 
 Over time various conceptualizations of normative and non-normative grief (i.e., 
prolonged grief, pathological grief, complicated grief, persistent complex bereavement disorder) 
have emerged in the field. As a result, clinicians have faced considerable challenges when it 
comes to providing accurate diagnoses when working with the bereaved. In addition to the lack 
of consensus regarding the diagnostic criteria, the utility of PGD developed for ICD-11 is limited 
by clinicians’ lack of familiarity with the disorder and the potential to instead rely on existing 
heuristics and beliefs. 
The current study built on previous research that successfully used a multi-modal 
debiasing approach to reduce diagnostic and treatment decision errors. The following study 
emulated the approach taken by Jenkins and Youngstrom (2016) in their cognitive debiasing 
intervention for PBD, and modified the intervention to randomize clinicians into a general 
presentation on the stress and trauma related disorders section of the ICD-11 that included the 
diagnostic criteria of PGD or the same presentation with an added cognitive debiasing 
intervention. Following a presentation of either the control or intervention condition, all 
clinicians were asked to read three patient vignettes in which potential decision-making errors 
and biases were embedded in the text. Following each vignette, clinicians were asked to provide 
a diagnosis in order to assess the effects on decision-making accuracy. They were be asked to 




 The present study aimed to (a) assess the efficacy of a cognitive debiasing intervention 
that educates clinicians about common cognitive errors in the diagnosis of PGD and provides 
strategies to reduce these errors for improving the diagnostic accuracy of PGD. In addition to 
assessing the impact of this intervention on diagnostic decision accuracy, the study (b) assessed 
the effectiveness of the intervention on reducing specific diagnostic errors such as availability, 
over-pathologizing, and the representativeness heuristic.  
In light of the reviewed research above, the following was hypothesized: 
(1) It was hypothesized that the cognitive debiasing intervention would be 
successful in increasing the overall diagnostic accuracy of PGD when 
compared to a control condition. 
(2) It was also hypothesized that the intervention would reduce the occurrence of 
specific cognitive errors including availability, over-pathologizing and 
representativeness heuristics.  
(3) It was hypothesized that evidence of system 1 decision-making and bias 
activation would be most evident among individuals in the control condition 
when compared to those in the intervention condition. 
(4) Exploratory analyses would also assess any effects of practice setting and 
years of experience on diagnostic accuracy.  
Methods 
Participants 
 Participants were clinicians identified through the American Psychological Association 
membership directory. Recruitment information was sent via publicly available email addresses. 
Eligible clinicians were currently seeing individuals for psychotherapy or psychodiagnostic 
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assessments and employed in a position that requires the diagnosis of mental health disorders. 
Clinicians were excluded if they did not currently see patients for clinical activities, if children 
and/or adolescents comprise the majority of their practice, or if they did not have a position that 
requires diagnosis of mental health disorders. Participants were entered into a raffle to win one 
$200 first prize or one of three $100 second prizes to incentivize their participation. 
Procedure 
 The study data were collected and managed using the Qualtrics electronic data capture 
tools hosted at Virginia Commonwealth University. Presentation materials were embedded in the 
Qualtrics survey as pre-recorded narrated PowerPoint videos.  
Clinicians accessed study materials through a Web address enclosed in the recruitment 
email message. Upon accessing the Qualtrics website, clinicians were directed to the consent 
page and indicated whether or not they were interested in participating and gave their consent. 
Uninterested clinicians were thanked for their time and exited out of the survey, while clinicians 
who agreed to participate were directed to the start of the survey.  
Following the consent page, participants were directed to a short demographic 
questionnaire. In order to reduce the incidence of missing data, all questions within the Qualtrics 
survey included a prompt inquiring if the participant purposely meant to keep an answer blank 
and if they would like to return to answer it. This did not force the individual to provide a 
response to any question, but ensured that accidentally missed items could be answered. 
Following completion of the demographic questionnaire, Qualtrics automatically randomized 
participants to a screen with one of two video embedded presentations. Embedded video 
presentations were either a short presentation on stress-related disorders in ICD-11, including 
PGD (i.e., control group) or both the short presentation on stress related disorders in ICD-11 and 
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the cognitive debiasing intervention (i.e., intervention group). In order to assess completion of 
viewing the video presentation, a timer was included to track how long participants were on each 
page of the study survey. 
Following the video presentations, participants completed a short survey about the 
presentation to check participant’s attention and confirm the clarity of the presentations. 
Participants then viewed the three case vignettes, randomized to minimize ordering effects. Each 
vignette was followed by questions related to the clinician’s diagnosis, their confidence in their 
diagnosis, and how they would rate the patient’s severity. In the intervention group, one vignette 
had a unique post-vignette survey which is detailed below. After completing all vignettes and 
associated questions, clinicians in the control group completed the study and were redirected to 
the separate raffle survey. Clinicians in the intervention group were asked questions about the 
acceptability of the intervention and their knowledge of grief before being redirected to the raffle 
survey. 
Materials 
 Demographics Survey. Participants were asked to complete a short demographics 
survey before completing the intervention (see Appendix for copies of all measures). The 
questionnaire asked about gender, age, level of education, degree type, clinical specialization, 
years of licensure and post-graduate experience providing psychotherapy or psychodiagnostic 
assessments, practice setting (e.g., private practice, psychiatric hospital, outpatient program, 
hospital based system), distribution of patient’s ages, theoretical orientation(s), role distribution 
(e.g., research, clinical work), and finally familiarity with the diagnostic criteria of prolonged 
grief disorder and other disorders (measured on a sliding scale where 1 = not at all familiar and 6 
= very familiar). 
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Debiasing Intervention. The debiasing intervention and control condition both included 
a short pre-recorded narrated PowerPoint presentation with a brief overview on disorders to be 
included in ICD-11 stress and related disorders section (e.g., posttraumatic stress disorder, 
adjustment disorder, prolonged grief disorder). Following this first section of the presentation, 
the control group was directed to the next step of the study protocol, while the debiasing 
intervention group viewed the second portion of the narrated presentation. In this portion of the 
presentation, clinicians were advised regarding the common diagnostic pitfalls of PGD, 
including mistaking PGD for depression or other psychopathology, comparing cases to past or 
personal experiences of bereavement, and overlooking disenfranchised grievers. These pitfalls 
were then related to common heuristics and biases that are thought to lead to distorted diagnostic 
decision-making. Clinicians were also provided with techniques and strategies to reduce 
diagnostic errors by intervening in the automatic decision-making processes. For links to the 
above-mentioned interventions, see Appendix J. 
Attention Check. Following the presentations, both groups were directed to short 
surveys about the presentation content before reviewing vignettes (see Appendix B and 
Appendix C). These surveys served as a tool for verifying participants attended to the 
presentation content. Participants who scored more than one standard deviation below the mean 
were excluded from further analyses. Following the completion of the attention check survey, all 
participants were directed to a random series of three patient vignettes.  
Vignettes. Vignettes were developed using diagnostic criteria from the proposed ICD-11 
criteria for PGD (Killikelly & Maercker, 2018). Drafting of vignettes was done by referencing 
previously available vignettes and by adhering to recommendations for vignette development 
outlined in Evans et al. (2015). Drafts of vignettes were exchanged between two study team 
 
 24 
members to improve consensus regarding diagnostic clarity. Vignettes were developed with the 
aim of examining specific decision-making errors. Following development, vignettes were tested 
by 6 experts in the fields of grief and diagnosis of mental illnesses. Following expert review, the 
vignettes were updated based on the panel’s recommendations.  
Availability effects. The first vignette described Mrs. Taylor who is a recently bereaved 
widow with PGD (see Appendix D). Given that 16.2% adults report a lifetime incidence of major 
depressive disorder, but only 10% of bereaved adults meet criteria for PGD, it is likely that most 
mental health professionals will be more familiar with and more easily call to mind symptoms of 
major depressive disorder. Mrs. Taylor’s high level of distress and behavior may be interpreted 
as major depressive disorder, depending on individual’s level of familiarity with and clinical 
experience with pathological grief.  
Representativeness. The second vignette described Kimberly who is a college student 
with PGD (see Appendix E). Kimberly’s case is intended to demonstrate the impact of the 
representativeness bias, or the misguiding effects of a clinician’s stereotype of a prototypical 
presentation of a diagnosis. This bias has shown to reduce decision-maker’s reliance on known 
probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  In the case of Kimberly, her college roommate with 
whom she does not have a substantial social relationship passes away after contracting 
meningitis when Kimberly is out of town. Kimberly represents a non-typical bereavement, in 
that her relationship to the bereaved is not one that is recognized by her social circles or greater 
society (Doka, 1989). As this presentation violates common presumptions about who can and 
cannot grieve (i.e., close, important, familiar losses), it is expected that when the reader 
compares this case to their representative case, Kimberly’s presentation will appear less valid as 
a PGD case resulting in reduced diagnostic accuracy. One way to combat issues of 
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representativeness is by giving information about alternative presentations and making clinicians 
aware of any information related to prevalence and/or base rates. For the purposes of this 
intervention, available information about disenfranchised grief was included in the debiasing 
intervention. 
Over-pathologizing. The third vignette described Mr. Greg Learly who is an older adult 
whose twin sister passed away after contracting pneumonia (see Appendix F). This vignette 
attempts to showcase a normative grief response, with the hope of capturing the documented bias 
among psychologists and other mental health clinicians to over emphasize evidence of pathology 
(Ganzach, 2000; Ganzach, 1997; Meyer & Meyer, 2009). Given the commonality of grief and 
bereavement, early prominent and influential theories (Kübler-Ross, 1969; Freud, 1917), and the 
limited empirical inquiry into the trajectory of grief (Bonnano et al., 2002), clinicians have been 
left with limited direction regarding how to identify non-normative grief. In light of the lack of 
information and guidelines for diagnosis, pathological elements may be weighed more heavily. 
In order to counteract these potential effects, the debiasing intervention included 
psychoeducation on the non-linear, non-staged trajectory of grief. The intervention also 
referenced a short mnemonic device to recall the symptoms required for a PGD diagnosis (i.e., 
“SLOPE IN” greater than Six months duration, Longing for the deceased Or Preoccupation, 
intense Emotions, causing Impairment, and violating cultural Norms), which has shown to be 
successful in reducing reliance on memory to recall diagnostic criteria (Jenkins & Youngstrom, 
2016). 
Post-vignette measures. Following all vignettes (with the exception of the availability 
bias vignette for the intervention group) participants in both groups were asked to (i) make a 
decision about the most likely diagnosis given the information in the vignette, (ii) provide a 
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clinical judgment regarding the severity of this case on a sliding scale (0 = not at all severe, 50 = 
moderately severe, 100 = extremely severe), and (iii) provide a confidence rating in their 
diagnosis on a sliding scale (0 = not at all confident, 50 = moderately confident, 100 = extremely 
confident, absolutely certain; see Appendix G).  
Post-availability vignette: Intervention group. At the end of the availability vignette, 
participants were instructed to advance to the next page once they had finished reading the 
vignette. Individuals in the intervention group were asked to first list reasons in support of their 
preliminary diagnosis as well as a competing diagnosis in two text boxes. Once they had 
completed these two questions, intervention participants were then asked to select the most likely 
diagnosis, rate the severity of the case, and provide a confidence rating regarding their diagnosis 
for the case (see Appendix H).   
Intervention group acceptability survey. Following the vignettes and associated 
surveys, individuals in the intervention group were asked to answer a brief survey about their 
experience and satisfaction with the intervention presentation and resources. They were also 
asked to report on the percentage of their clinical work that includes treating bereaved 
individuals, personal experiences with grief, and any other resources they used during the study 
(see Appendix I). 
Statistical Analysis Plan  
Chi-Square Analyses. In order to assess the effect of the intervention on overall 
diagnostic accuracy (hypothesis 1), we conducted a 2 x 2 chi-square analysis in order to compare 
the percent of correct diagnoses in the control condition, percent incorrect in the control 
condition, percent correct diagnoses in the intervention condition, and percent incorrect in the 
intervention condition. Additionally, to evaluate the effect of the intervention on each embedded 
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bias being activated within the individual vignettes (hypothesis 2), we conducted three separate 2 
x 2 chi square analyses to compare the proportion of accurate and inaccurate diagnoses across 
the control and intervention conditions in each vignette. 
 Point-Biserial Correlations. Given that activating the embedded biases within the 
vignettes is necessary to test the effectiveness of the debiasing intervention, separate analyses 
were completed in order to assess bias activation (hypothesis 3). It was hypothesized that with 
reduced time spent deliberating, increased perception of case severity, and increased confidence 
in diagnostic accuracy, diagnostic accuracy would be more greatly impacted by system one, or 
automated, decision-making. In order to evaluate this assumption, point biserial correlations 
were conducted to assess the association between time spent deliberating, higher severity and 
confidence ratings (0-100) and diagnostic accuracy (correct/incorrect). This was repeated for 
each vignette in order to assess bias activation across all patient vignettes.  
 Intervention Reception. Descriptive analyses were conducted in order to assess how the 
intervention was received, including clinician’s opinions regarding the utility of the intervention 
presentation, as well as their reported use of the resources to complete their diagnostic decision-
making. 
Exploratory Analyses. Finally, exploratory analyses assessed for any differences 
between any demographic or background factors (i.e., age, years of experience, practice setting, 
theoretical orientation, age distribution of clients in practice, and role distribution) on diagnostic 
accuracy (hypothesis 4). In the intervention group, Pearson correlations tested the association 
between percentage of a clinician’s practice dedicated to treating the bereaved and percent 
correct diagnoses. One-way ANOVAs compared diagnostic accuracy across degree type and 





 Demographic data and outcome variables. We invited 10,101 clinicians to participate 
in the study by email; 122 (1.21%) clinicians responded to our initial request for participation. 
We obtained permission from the Institutional Review Board to contact respondents who had not 
completed the survey a second time and an additional 56 (0.55%) clinicians responded. Of these 
clinicians, 178 (1.76%) responded to some study items, and 78 (43.82%) of initiators completed 
the study in its entirety. Fourteen participants (21.79%) were excluded after reviewing the 
amount of time spent on presentation pages, scores on attention checks, and reviewing data for 
suspicious response patterns. We also excluded 6 clinicians (7.69%) who reported the majority 
of their practice comprised work with children. The final sample was comprised of the 58 
remaining participants (74.36%). For information regarding the demographic and professional 
features of the final sample, as well as between group comparisons, refer to Table 2.     
Hypothesis Testing 
Diagnostic Accuracy. In order to assess the impact of the intervention on overall 
diagnostic accuracy across all three vignettes we conducted chi-square analyses that revealed an 
overall non-significant relationship, χ2 (3, N = 56) = 4.46, p = 0.22, contrary to our hypothesis. 
We also conducted additional chi-square analyses to assess the impact of the intervention on the 
biases embedded within each vignette. Contrary to our hypotheses, analyses revealed no 
significant difference in diagnostic accuracy in the first vignette (Mrs. Tracey) intended to 
activate the availability bias (χ2 [1, N = 56] = 2.99, p = 0.08), the second vignette (Kimberly) 
intended to activate the representativeness bias (χ2 [1, N = 56] = 1.73, p = 0.19), or the final 
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vignette (Greg Learly) intended to activate the over-pathologizing bias (χ2 [1, N = 56] = 0.22, p = 
0.64). For the full pattern of accurate and inaccurate diagnoses across vignettes, see Table 3. 
Additionally, we reviewed the responses of the clinicians in the intervention condition 
following the first vignette (Mrs. Tracey). Clinicians were required to list two preliminary 
diagnoses and list reasons for and against each. The vast majority of clinicians listed one 
diagnosis as PGD (n = 35; 92.11%). The following diagnoses were listed as differential 
diagnoses: MDD (n = 20; 52.63%), PTSD (n = 6; 15.79%), adjustment disorder (n = 4; 10.53%), 
persistent depressive disorder (n = 3; 7.89%), generalized anxiety disorder (n = 2; 5.26%), acute 
stress disorder (n = 2; 5.26%), complex stress disorder (n = 1; 2.63%), dementia (n = 1; 2.63%), 
and no diagnosis (n = 1; 2.63%). 
 Measurement of Bias Activation. We then conducted point-biserial correlations to 
assess bias activation in each vignette. These were conducted separately in both the intervention 
and control groups and included assessing the relationship between diagnostic accuracy and the 
following variables: time, confidence, and severity. It was expected that bias activation would be 
more evident among clinicians in the control condition, with clinicians completing the debiasing 
intervention less likely to show evidence of bias activation.  
Time and Accuracy. Time spent considering the available data (e.g., reading the vignette, 
responding to diagnostic questions) was used a proxy for engagement in system 1 (automatic, 
heuristic based) or system 2 (deliberate, effortful) thinking. As time spent reviewing the data 
increased, the rationale was that more deliberate decision-making was occurring (system 2) and 
would be associated with increased diagnostic accuracy. Conversely less time spent reviewing 
the materials would indicate automatic, heuristic based decision-making (system 1) more likely 
to result in decreased accuracy. It was hypothesized that a positive relationship between accuracy 
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and time would be stronger among those in the intervention condition. However, there was no 
relationship between time or accuracy across any of the vignettes in either the control or 
intervention groups (see Table 4). 
Confidence and Accuracy. Existing literatures would suggest that across all vignettes, as 
clinician’s confidence in their diagnosis increases, diagnostic accuracy would decrease (Oskamp, 
1965), with a significant negative relationship expected among the control condition, with a 
weaker or nonsignificant relationship in the intervention condition. However, there was no 
relationship between confidence and accuracy across any of the vignettes in either the control or 
intervention groups (see Table 4). 
Severity and Accuracy. Based on the biases embedded within each vignette, severity was 
expected to be differentially related to diagnostic accuracy. For the first vignette (Mrs. Tracey) 
which tested the availability heuristic, we hypothesized that as the clinician’s perspective on the 
severity of the pathology increased, they would be more likely to rely on familiar or more 
“available” diagnoses (e.g., MDD, PTSD), particularly among clinicians in the control condition 
resulting in a negative relationship between severity and accuracy. This relationship was 
expected to be weaker and non-significant in the intervention group. However, among 
individuals in the control condition there was a significant positive relationship between severity 
and diagnostic accuracy, r(27) = 0.50, p < 0.01 and a nonsignificant positive relationship among 
clinicians in the intervention condition,  r(25) = 0.17, p = 0.39.  
It was hypothesized that in the second vignette meant to activate the representativeness 
heuristic (Kimberly, disenfranchised grief), clinicians in the control condition would be more 
likely to engage in societal biases about who can be “bereaved,” reducing their likelihood of 
accurately diagnosing Kimberly with a bereavement-related disorder (i.e., PGD) and perceiving 
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her symptoms as less severe.  A positive relationship between accuracy and severity was 
expected among clinicians in the control condition, with a negative relationship expected among 
clinicians in the intervention condition. However, there was a non-significant negative 
relationship between severity or accuracy in the control group, r(27) = -0.04, p = 0.85 and the 
intervention group, r(25) = -0.11, p = 0.58. 
It was hypothesized that in the third vignette (Mr. Learly) meant to activate the over-
pathologizing bias, that as clinicians’ ratings of severity increased, their likelihood of engaging 
in over pathologizing would increase, thus reducing their diagnostic accuracy of normative grief. 
This negative relationship between severity and accuracy was expected to be more pronounced 
among individuals in the control condition. However, analyses showed a significant strong 
negative relationship among both the control condition r(27) = -0.53, p = < 0.01 and the 
intervention group, r(25) = -0.67, p = < 0.01. See Table 4 for descriptive statistics of the bias 
activating variables and the full pattern of correlations. 
 Intervention Reception and Experience with Grief. Descriptive analyses revealed the 
majority of respondents who completed the intervention used presentations materials (92.59%; n 
= 25) and would agree (at least somewhat) that the presentation was helpful in making their 
diagnosis (85.19%; n = 23). Clinicians also agreed that the presentation taught them something 
new (88.89%; n = 24), was easy to understand (77.78%; n = 21), and that they would recommend 
the presentation to a colleague (74.07%; n = 20). With respect to outside materials used to aid 
diagnostic decision-making, the majority did not use outside materials (74.07%; n = 20); 
however, some clinicians did report using the DSM (22.22%; n = 6), ICD (11.11%; n = 3), and 
general internet search (n = 1). The vast majority of clinicians who completed the intervention 
reported a personal experience with grief (n = 21). Other experiences or factors that formed 
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beliefs about grief and bereavement included spiritual beliefs (n = 6), life philosophy (n = 4), 
professional experience (n = 4), and pop culture (n = 1).  
Exploratory Analyses. Finally, exploratory analyses using the overall sample assessed 
for any relationship between person-level factors (e.g., age, years of experience, practice setting, 
theoretical orientation, age distribution of clients in practice, role distribution) and diagnostic 
accuracy using Pearson correlations. Results revealed no significant relationships between 
diagnostic accuracy and person-level variables, with the exception of a negative relationship 
between accuracy and practice in residential care settings, r(54) = -0.27, p = 0.04. Similarly, a 
one-way ANOVA did not demonstrate differences in accuracy between degree types, F(2,53) = 
0.75, p = 0.48, or clinical specializations, F(3,52) = 1.47, p = 0.23 (see Table 2). In the 
intervention group, overall accuracy was not associated with the percentage of a clinician’s 
practice dedicated to treating the bereaved, r(25) = -0.32, p = 0.10, their years of postgraduate 
experience (r(25) = -0.24, p = 0.22), or years of licensed practice (r(2) = 0.30, p = 0.12). 
Discussion 
In this study we aimed to test the effectiveness of a cognitive debiasing intervention for 
improving the diagnostic accuracy of bereaved patients and of prolonged grief disorder. The 
overall results are summarized here with extended discussion of each aim following the 
summary. We hypothesized that the cognitive debiasing intervention would be successful in 
increasing overall diagnostic accuracy when compared to a control condition and would reduce 
the occurrence of specific cognitive errors embedded within each vignette including availability, 
representativeness, and over-pathologizing. These hypotheses were tested with chi-square 
analyses and revealed non-significant effects of the debiasing intervention on overall diagnostic 
accuracy, as well as a non-significant effect with respect to the three embedded biases. 
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Further, we hypothesized that evidence of system 1 decision-making and bias activation 
would be most evident among individuals in the control condition, particularly when compared 
to those in the intervention condition. In order to evaluate this assumption, point biserial 
correlations were conducted to assess the association between several indicators of bias 
activation (i.e., time spent deliberating, severity, and confidence) and diagnostic accuracy 
(correct/incorrect). Results of these analyses did not reveal any significant associations between 
diagnostic accuracy and time or confidence ratings in either the intervention or control group. 
There were significant relationships between diagnostic accuracy and severity ratings in some, 
but not all the vignettes. This relationship was observed in the vignette meant to activate the 
availability bias, though the association was somewhat contrary to expectation with a positive 
rather than negative relationship between the two variables observed among individuals in the 
control condition. The expected relationship between accuracy and severity was seen in the 
vignette meant to assessed over-pathologizing, with a significant negative association between 
the two variables in both groups. However, there was not a significant relationship between 
diagnostic accuracy and severity in the vignette intended to activate the representativeness bias.   
Last, we conducted exploratory analyses to assess for effects of person-level factors, such 
as practice setting and years of experience, on diagnostic accuracy. Results revealed no 
significant relationships between diagnostic accuracy and person-level variables, with the 
exception of a weak negative relationship between accuracy and the percent of time spent 
practicing in residential care settings.  
Diagnostic Accuracy  
Availability. The first vignette was intended to assess the effectiveness of the 
intervention on the availability bias and was the only vignette where participants in the 
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intervention group were asked to actively engage in a debiasing exercise during their deliberation 
(i.e., considering reasons for and against a primary and alternative diagnosis). It was expected 
that without intervention, clinicians in the control group would rely on bringing to mind more 
“available” diagnoses, such as MDD or PTSD given the relatively higher prevalence of these 
diagnoses and low rate of PGD among bereaved individuals (Lundorff et al., 2017). However, 
while approaching significance at p = 0.08, there was no significant difference between the two 
group’s rate of accuracy, and in fact the control group appeared to outperform the intervention 
group (86.21% and 66.67% respectively). This was contrary to our original hypothesis that this 
severe case of PGD would activate an availability bias and result in poorer accuracy among 
control group respondents. It is possible that this active debiasing intervention of listing reasons 
for an against a primary and secondary diagnosis introduced doubt among participants in the 
intervention group, resulting in lower accuracy. However, among the incorrect responses, the 
expected diagnoses were offered (e.g., MDD [n = 6], PTSD [n = 3], and adjustment disorder [n = 
2]) suggesting an availability bias may have occurred among those indicating an incorrect 
response. It is also possible the overall high rate of accurate diagnoses may represent a ceiling 
effect, given that overall only 23% of participants gave an inaccurate diagnosis. However, it is 
interesting that the intervention appears to be trending towards reducing diagnostic accuracy. 
This could be an artifact of our sample or could reflect a true negative impact of this debiasing 
technique when conceptualizing severe cases of bereavement related distress. This should be 
clarified in a larger sample with greater power. 
Representativeness. The second vignette depicted a case of disenfranchised grief and 
was designed to activate the representativeness heuristic, reducing the diagnostic accuracy 
among individuals in the control condition who did not receive psychoeducation on 
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disenfranchised grief. While there was no effect of the intervention on diagnostic accuracy, the 
response distribution between the two groups conformed to the expected pattern. There was a 
higher rate of inaccurate responses in the control group (72%), while the distribution was more 
even among individuals in the intervention group (55%). It is possible that in a larger sample this 
would have resulted in a significant difference. 
Over-pathologizing. The third vignette was a normative bereavement response, with 
elements meant to activate the tendency to over-pathologize. While the intervention did not have 
an effect on diagnostic accuracy, there was evidence of bias activation across both groups, as 
higher severity ratings were associated with poorer diagnostic accuracy. It is possible that some 
of the myths of normative bereavement have been sufficiently debunked within the literature, 
with more providers aware of normative bereavement responses.    
 Overall, the findings of nonsignificant results are not unusual, given a number of studies 
have shown non-significant effects of cognitive debiasing interventions among mental health 
professionals (Parmley, 2006; Jefferies-Sewel, 2015; Haderlie, 2011). In this case, as well as in 
others, it is possible the materials used to activate the bias or the intervention itself were not 
sufficient to measure or elicit a change in diagnostic accuracy between the two groups. When 
compared to Jenkins and Youngstrom’s (2016) design, the vignettes that were used in this study 
were significantly longer and included all the necessary details to make an accurate diagnosis, 
should the provider look for them. It is possible that the shorter vignettes used in their design 
introduced more ambiguity and uncertainty, thus producing a stronger effect of the embedded 
biases.   
However, it is also possible that these results indicate that cognitive debiasing is not 
effective for clinicians diagnosing the bereaved. In one study which assessed the diagnostic 
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accuracy of clinical vignettes depicting bereavement related distress, clinicians were only about 
50% accurate in differentiating normative and non-normative bereavement and disagreed 
whether distress was outside cultural norms and if it had occurred for an abnormal period of time 
(50% Yes, 35% No, 15% Not Sure; Keeley et al., 2016). While null effects of debiasing have 
been observed among other samples of mental health professionals, it has been reliably shown to 
minimize errors in medical settings, improving accuracy and safety during surgical procedures 
(Haynes et al., 2009), diagnostic imaging (Duijm, Groenewoud, Fracheboud, & De Koning, 
2007), and conducting histology (Kronz, Westra, & Epstein, 1999) just to name a few examples. 
While the fields of medicine and mental health share many similarities, they have important 
differences in their respective diagnostic processes and classification systems which may impact 
the efficacy of debiasing the clinical decision-making process. Rapid advancements in laboratory 
testing have shifted much of modern diagnosis and into laboratory tests. When a doctor 
completes a physical exam, they can observe symptoms and signs of illness (e.g., fever, 
inflammation, abnormal anatomical structure), which allows them to create a hypothesis of what 
may be the underlying cause of the patient’s illness. While doctors create a testable hypothesis 
based on this process, the underlying cause is increasingly determined through diagnostic tests 
(e.g., imaging, biopsy).  
Despite attempts to operationalize psychopathology with diagnostic classification 
systems such as the ICD and DSM and agreed upon diagnostic criteria, diagnosing a mental 
illness relies on the clinician being able to identify a cluster of presenting symptoms and decide 
how they map onto previously understood diagnostic constructs. It is because of this divergence 
from the hypothesis and objective testing of medicine, that coming to diagnoses of mental illness 
is so much more subjective, because clinicians lack a method to definitely test their hypotheses. 
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Simply put, there is no readily available blood test for depression like there is for diabetes, 
anemia, or other common chronic health conditions. As such, the process for diagnosing physical 
disorders and mental disorders diverge in some slight, but distinct ways. Because of the abstract 
nature of diagnosing mental disorders, there are more unknowns and fewer certainties with 
which to make decisions (Garb, 1998). The boundaries are ambiguous and the underlying 
etiology remains complex and multifactorial (Garb, Lilienfeld, & Fowler, 2005), thus the 
decision-making process includes more opportunities for clinical judgment and is also vulnerable 
to more mistakes. It is possible this type of multi-modal debiasing approach is not sufficient to 
improve the diagnostic accuracy of mental health diagnoses, particularly for a diagnosis with 
significant overlap with other psychological concepts (e.g., MDD, PTSD, adjustment disorder) 
and limited features making them distinct from other psychopathology (i.e., mania in pediatric 
bipolar disorder). 
Exploratory Analyses  
 Results of the exploratory analyses on the relationship between person-level factors and 
diagnostic accuracy did not show a significant association, often with negligible effect sizes. 
There was a small negative significant association between diagnostic accuracy and percentage 
of time spent in a residential setting, though given the small sample size and weak association 
limited interpretations can be made from this relationship. Nonetheless, work in residential 
settings may result in a strong skill set working with a specific population, and thereby may 
reduce exposure to cases that would typically be seen and evaluated in an outpatient setting. The 
absence of the significant association between diagnostic accuracy and experience is consistent 
with other studies showing no effect of experience on diagnostic accuracy (Webb, Keeley, & 
Eakin, 2016; Marsh & Ahn, 2012). 
 
 38 
Study Strengths and Limitations 
 This study contributes to the limited number of studies that have empirically assessed the 
effectiveness of cognitive debiasing interventions for improving diagnostic accuracy among 
mental health professionals. While there has been an adoption of debiasing in the medical field, 
there is far less research on the application of these techniques with mental health professionals. 
This study provides valuable information for future researchers attempting to evaluate other 
debiasing interventions with mental health professionals. 
This intervention also assessed the effectiveness of the multimodal cognitive debiasing 
format with a new diagnostic challenge: PGD.  To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study 
to attempt to improve the accuracy of diagnosing bereaved individuals with debiasing. Given the 
persistent challenges faced by clinicians attempting to treat the bereaved, calls for more research 
to confirm the symptomology of a non-normative grief response (APA, 2013), and mythology of 
“normal” grief, this study aimed to provide guidance for clinicians hoping to optimize their 
accuracy when working with the bereaved. 
This study is not without limitations. An a priori power analysis estimated that to detect a 
large effect, 52 clinicians would need to be randomized between the two conditions. While 56 
clinicians were recruited, the original study conducted by Jenkins and Youngstrom (2016) 
included 137 clinicians and nonsignificant results raise concern about the possibility of an 
underpowered sample. This may be particularly relevant if the variability in the intervention and 
methodology between the two studies produced only a small or medium effect, which may not be 
detectible in such a small sample. Further, the sample was not large enough to detect small 
effects of the exploratory analyses, so we are limited in our ability to draw strong conclusions 
about the lack of relationship between accuracy and experience, though findings are consistent 
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with the prior literature (Webb, Keeley, & Eakin, 2016; Marsh & Ahn, 2012). Of note, 
recruitment also occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, which may have resulted in less 
participation. It is possible that clinicians had less time to take on additional tasks such as 
participating in a dissertation research study, contributing to our small sample size. This may not 
be a barrier to recruitment for future research using this methodological approach. 
Relatedly, the COVID-19 pandemic not only altered the structure of clinician’s 
professional lives to provide continuity of care, but it also significantly increased the salience of 
grief and loss on a national scale. As of April 30th, 2021, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) report 571,297 people in the United States had lost their lives to the virus, 
with 383,518 of those deaths occurring in 2020 (CDC, 2021). This brings into question the 
potential effects of this historical pandemic on clinician’s familiarity with and attention to 
bereavement and bereavement related distress. It is possible that this increased exposure resulted 
in clinicians familiarizing themselves with diagnostic criteria, appropriate treatments, and 
subsequently de-bunking previously held biases/beliefs about grief and loss. 
In addition to the cultural landscape during which data collection occurred, there are 
several aspects of the methodology and intervention itself that may have had unexpected effects 
on the effectiveness of the intervention. For example, intervention dose may have been an issue 
as the control presentation itself was 9 minutes, with the intervention group receiving an 
additional 10 minutes of information. However, while the demands on sustained attention may 
have dampened the effectiveness of the intervention, this seems unlikely given that in the 
original study by Jenkins and Youngstrom (2016) the control presentation and intervention were 
5 minutes and 20 minutes respectively. It is possible that fatigue during study procedures may 
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have impacted the benefit derived from the intervention, particularly given that the vignettes 
used in this study were much longer than those used by Jenkins and Youngstrom (2016).  
It is also possible that a ceiling effect may have reduced opportunities for bias activation 
within each vignette. Each vignette included all the information necessary to assess if the 
bereaved individual met diagnostic criteria of PGD, which were provided in both conditions. 
Further, only three providers in the intervention condition did not list PGD as one of the two 
diagnoses they were considering. Conversely, the original multi-modal debiasing intervention 
included short vignettes that introduced a number of unknown variables about the case (Jenkins 
& Youngstrom, 2016). Providing complete information was convenient and allowed the clinician 
to optimize their diagnostic accuracy, but it may have reduced the presence of bias activation in 
each vignette. 
Further, with the current design, it was not possible to measure the degree to which 
simply participating in a research study primed clinicians to be more diligent in their diagnostic 
determinations and altered their decision-making process. Instead of relying on system 1 
thinking, which is known to be prone to heuristics and biases, clinicians may have engaged in a 
more deliberate system 2 decision-making process under the premise that they were being 
evaluated. Researchers may be able to overcome the dampening impact of observer effects by 
increasing the degree of bias activation through introducing more ambiguity in the case vignettes 
or manipulating factors or symptoms known to increase bias (e.g., disenfranchised grief AND 
symptoms that have overlap with more well-known diagnoses). Researchers may want to 
evaluate the effectiveness of this type of intervention in a more naturalistic setting, such as 
through a program evaluation inquiry. Given that the presentation provides information useful to 
all clinicians in practice (e.g., diagnostic criteria), perhaps it would be possible to minimize 
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expectancy effects by delivering the control presentation and intervention as part of professional 
development program and then assess the rate of bereavement-related diagnoses made across the 
two groups. While this may introduce its own methodological challenges, it may give more 
insight into any practical implications of this type of intervention. 
Finally, this project utilized an active control and did not include a simple control 
condition without any presentation. There is research that has shown that training in diagnostic 
coding and increased familiarity with diagnostic criteria is a debasing intervention in and of itself 
(Rezvyy et al., 2008). Perhaps the control presentation had its own debiasing effect and when 
compared with the full debiasing intervention there were no significant additional benefits to 
diagnostic accuracy. However, it is possible that when compared to a simple control condition 
the active control condition and debiasing intervention may have shown significant effects. 
Further, while randomization of the vignettes was used to control for any ordering effects, due to 
the small sample it was not possible to assess any potential effects of ordering on accuracy or the 
priming effect of repeated exposure to bereaved case vignettes. A fully between-subjects design 
where each participant saw only one vignette could address this issue but would have 
necessitated a substantially larger sample. 
Future Directions 
 The current study provides future directions for researchers and clinicians interested in 
making improvements in diagnostics with debiasing. While we attempted to reach a range of 
providers to vet the vignettes, only six providers were available to review the vignettes. More 
rigorous testing of vignettes may address concerns that bias activation was not sufficient to test 
the effectiveness of the intervention. Further, assessing the optimal “dose” of intervention may 
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also help clarify if the high burden of the intervention and study dampened some of the 
potentially positive effects of the intervention.  
 However, despite the nonsignificant effects of the intervention, this study demonstrates 
that many clinicians struggle to identify PGD and normative grief, even in a controlled setting, as 
76.78% of clinicians made at least one inaccurate diagnosis. This finding confirms the 
importance of providing additional guidance, education, and intervention for clinicians to 
improve the clinical care of bereaved individuals.  
Conclusions 
 This study assessed the effect of a cognitive debiasing intervention on the diagnostic 
accuracy of clinicians evaluating bereaved patients. While no significant improvement in 
diagnostic accuracy was detected, there was evidence of bias activation. Further, we are able to 
make some hypotheses about the potential limitations of the current design and make suggestions 
for future research. Overall, this work confirms the need for additional guidance, education, and 
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(Shear et al., 2011) 
PGD 
(Prigerson et al., 2009) 
PGD 
(ICD-11) 
Time duration 12 
months 
≥1 month 
(bereaved ≥6 months) 
6 months 6 months 
Criterion B: Separation distress     
yearning/longing B B B B 
sorrow/emotional pain B B B B 
preoccupation with the deceased B B B B 
preoccupation with circumstances of the death B C   
     
Criterion C: Reactive distress to the stress     
difficulty accepting the death C C C C 
emotional numbness/being stunned C C C C 
difficulty in positively reminiscing C   C 
bitterness/anger C C C C 
self-blame and other maladaptive cognitive appraisal C C  C 
avoidance of reminders C C C  
Social/Identity Disruption     
desire to die (suicidal ideation) C B   
difficulty trusting others C C C  
loneliness C B   
considering life as empty, meaningless, and unfulfilling C B C  
confusion regarding self-identity/part of yourself died C  C C 
difficulty moving on C  C C 
     
CG symptoms     
difficulty caring for others  C   
envious of others who have not faced a loss  C   
experiencing symptoms of the deceased  C   
hearing or seeing the deceased  C   
excessive proximity seeking  C   
intense emotional/physiological reactivity to memories/reminders  C   




Table 2. Sample Characteristics 
 Relationship with  
Accuracy 
Intervention Group 
n = 27 
Control Group 
n = 29 
Comparison 
    χ2  p 
Gender    2.85 0.24 
Female  18 15  
Male  9 13  
Transgender/Non-binary  0 2  




















































Age -0.12 0.38 52.41 (12.9) 54.21 (17.31) 0.09 0.93 
     
    χ2  p 
Race/Ethnicity    6.82 0.34 
African American/Black  4 1  
Caucasian/White  20 24  
East Asian  1 2  
Latinx  2 1  
Middle Eastern  0 1  
Native American  0 0  
Native Hawaiian/Pacific 
Islander 
 0 0  
South Asian  1 0  
Other  2 1  
      
      
 F p   χ2 p 
Professional Degree 0.75 0.48   2.06 0.36 
PhD  19 24  
PsyD  5 4  
MA  3 1  
     
 F p   χ2  p 
Specialty Area 1.47 0.23   7.55 0.06 
Clinical  18 12  
Counseling  6 9  
Neuropsychology  0 5  
Other  1 3  
     
Experience r p   t p 










20.31 (16.06) 0.31 0.76 
Years of post-graduate 
experience  
-0.02 0.88 19.06 (13.93) 21.19 (16.29) 0.53 0.61 
Practice Settings r p   t p 
Community Mental Health -0.11 
 
 
0.41 21.35 (40.09) 9.93 (26.03) -1.27 0.21 
Hospital- Inpatient 0.05 0.74 
  
7.77 (19.22) 6.66 (18.92 -0.22 0.83 
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Hospital- Outpatient 0.01 0.95 16.73 (34.29) 12.24 (28.83) -0.53 0.60 
Forensic 0.17 0.23 4.04 (12.96) 10.86 (24.28) 1.28 0.21 
Residential Facility 0.27 0.04* 0.58 (2.94) 1.72 (7.59) 0.75 0.47 
School or University 0.13 0.36 10.77 (28.27) 26.79 (41.39) 1.66 0.10 
Other -0.09 0.53 38.77 (44.19) 31.79 (41.70) -0.60 0.55 
      
Theoretical Orientations r p   t p 
Cognitive -0.13 0.35 12.69 (23.46) 2.76 (7.02) -2.18 0.03* 
Cognitive Behavioral -0.21 0.12 3.65 (10.91) 5.86 (13.83) 0.65 0.52 
Emotion Focused -0.14 0.32 49.62 (34.26) 27.89 (30.57) -2.49 0.02* 
Family/Systems -0.10 0.48 0.77 (2.32) 3.28 (7.47) 1.64 0.11 
Humanistic 0.02 0.89 5.58 (10.52) 9.41 (14.78) 1.10 0.28 
Integrative 0.15 0.28 2.50 (8.15) 12.24 (25.30) 1.88 0.07 
Psychodynamic -0.01 0.97 11.15 (23.12) 13.38 (23.01) 0.36 0.72 
Other 0.20 0.15 6.35 (15.46) 11.55 (17.68) 1.16 0.25 
       
Clinical Age Group r p   t p 
0 to 10 years old 0.14 0.31 2.04 (5.59) 3.03 (6.85) 0.39 0.70 
11-18 years old -0.17 0.21 4.26 (7.56) 8.03 (11.48) 1.44 0.16 
Adults 0.13 0.33 78.89 (26.36) 82.45 (21.02) 0.56 0.56 
Couples -0.10 0.47 8.52 (13.14) 2.59 (6.07) -2.19 0.03* 
Family/Systems 0.001 0.99 5.93 (14.68) 3.28 (6.98) -0.87 0.39 
Other 0.04 0.79 0.37 (1.92) 0.69 (3.71) 0.40 0.69 
      
Role Distribution r p   t p 
Clinical Service -0.24 0.08 67.7 (33.8) 81.48 (28.05) 1.67 0.10 
Research 0.19 0.16 5.69 (11.17) 5.69 (14.12) -0.001 0.99 
Teaching 0.06 0.65 16.26 (25.68) 4.89 (9.37) -2.23 0.03* 
Administration 0.09 0.50 10.56 (22.76) 4.14 (8.87) -1.41 0.03* 
Other 0.18 0.18 0.00 (0.00) 3.79 (16.99) 1.16 0.25 
      
 r p   t p 







Table 3. Diagnostic Accuracy 
  Inaccurate Accurate Total χ2 p 
Vignette 1: Control 4 25 29   
Mrs. Tracey       
 Intervention 9 18 27   
       
 Total 13 43 56 2.995 0.08 
       
Vignette 2: Control 21 8 29   
Kimberly       
 Intervention 15 12 27   
       
 Total 36 20 56 1.731 0.19 
       
Vignette 3: Control 8 21 29   
Mrs. Learly       
 Intervention 9 18 27   
       
 Total 17 39 56 0.218 0.64 
       
Overall  Overall Diagnostic Accuracy Total χ2 p 
  0 1 2 3    
 Control 1 7 16 5 29   
         
 Intervention 4 6 9 8 27   
         
 Total 5 13 25 13 56 4.463 0.22 
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Table 4. Correlations between bias activation and accuracy 
 M (SD) Accuracy Severity Confidence Time 
 Control Intervention Control Intervention Control Intervention 
 
Control Intervention Control Intervention 
Vignette 1: 
Mrs. Tracey 




















(868.34) -0.30 0.11 0.04 0.86 -0.06 0.76 0.18 0.36 -0.07 0.70 -0.09 0.64 - - - - 
Vignette 2:  
Kimberly 
  




















(897.18) -0.09 0.63 -0.19 0.34 -0.17 0.38 -0.13 0.53 -0.26 0.18 0.23 0.24 - - - - 
Vignette 3:  
Mr. Learly 
  



























Demographics and Background Questionnaire (pre-intervention) 
 




☐ Other (please describe): ________________ 
 
2. Please select your race and ethnicity. You may select multiple if appropriate.  
☐ Asian American 
☐ African American/Black 
☐ Caucasian/White 
☐ East Asian 
☐ Latinx 
☐ Native American 
☐ Native Hawaii/Pacific Islander 
☐ South Asian 
☐ Other (please describe): ________________ 
 
3. Age: ______________ 
 






☐ Other (please describe): ________________ 
 




☐ Other (please describe): ________________ 
 
5. Number of years you have been practicing with a license: ______________ 
 
6. Number of years of post-graduate experience providing psychotherapy or conducting 
psychodiagnostic assessments: ______________ 
 
 










School or University……………………☐ 
Total…………………………………….☐ 
*If other, please describe here: ___________________________ 
 












*If other, please describe here: ___________________________ 
 
8. Please use percentages to show the distribution of your clinical work in the following age 
groups: 
 
Children, 0 to 10 years old…………......☐ 






*If other, please describe here: ___________________________ 
 










*If other, please describe here: ___________________________ 
 
 
10. Please rate your familiarity with the diagnostic criteria of the following disorders using the 
scale below: 
 
Not at all familiar           Very familiar 
 1  2  3  4  5   6 
 
• Major Depressive Disorder 
• Persistent Depressive Disorder 
• Bipolar Disorder 
• Cyclothymic Disorder 
• Psychotic Disorders 
• Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
• Panic Disorder 
• Specific Phobia 
• Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
• Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
• Acute Stress Disorder 
• Adjustment Disorder 
• Prolonged Grief Disorder 
• Borderline Personality Disorder 






Post Intervention Manipulation Check 
 
1. Which of the following diagnoses was not included in the stress and trauma related section of 
the ICD-11? 
 PTSD 
 Complex PTSD 
 Acute stress reaction 
 Adjustment disorder 
 Prolonged grief disorder 
 














5. The ICD-11 will help clinicians to make determinations between pathological and normative 




6. Availability refers to…? 
 Judging the probability that one would have expected a given outcome based on information 
available after the fact.  
 A debiasing intervention. 
 Making a decision based on the information most easily called to mind. 
 Decision-making error that results from comparing a current situation to a similar situation 
one has encountered in the past in order to determine the most likely answer. 
 













9. You have a patient who is reporting depressed mood and sleep changes; however, they have 
also recently lost a loved one in a traumatic accident. You are considering a number of 
diagnoses, but your gut tells you it is PTSD. Select the best next steps. 
☐ Go with you your gut 
☐ Refer them to a grief counselor 
☐ List reasons for and against each diagnosis 
☐ Begin an antidepressant to see if they respond to treatment 
 
10. SLoPE IN stands for… 
 Stop, Look closer, Present the Evidence, Integrate findings, & come to a Neutral decision 
 Six months duration, Longing for the deceased or Preoccupation, intense Emotions, causing     






Post Control Presentation Attention Check 
 
1. Which of the following diagnoses was not included in the stress and trauma related section of 
the ICD-11? 
 PTSD 
 Complex PTSD 
 Acute stress reaction 
 Adjustment disorder 
 Prolonged grief disorder 
 














5. The ICD-11 will help clinicians to make determinations between pathological and normative 












8. Complex PTSD is a new disorder that typically (though not required) arises after exposure to a 









9. In an acute stress reaction symptoms appear within hours to days of the stressful stimulus or 














Vignette 1 (PGD Case) 
Mrs. Tracey is a 67-year-old woman who presented to her primary care doctor’s visit for 
her annual check up with her adult son. Her primary care provider noted changes in her mood, 
disheveled appearance, and withdrawn presentation upon examination. She became tearful when 
her provider inquired about her husband. Mrs. Tracey reported that her husband passed away a 
little under a year ago after having a major heart attack while at a remote work site that required 
a thirty-minute ambulance ride to the nearest hospital. Upon arriving to the hospital, and shortly 
after Mrs. Tracey was called, he suffered a second heart attack and doctors were unable to revive 
him. Mrs. Tracey was unable to participate in funeral planning or settling Mr. Tracey’s estate; 
her adult son and his wife handled all the arrangements. Since then she has been unable to work, 
has broken ties with most of her and her husband’s friends, and has been avoiding her family 
members. Before Mr. Tracey passed, Mrs. Tracey and he were active members in their church 
community and had an active social life that including spending time with a group of couples 
they had known since their children were young. Since her husband passed, Mrs. Tracey spends 
most of her days at home carrying her husbands’ ashes in an urn with her as she moves 
throughout the home. Her son adds that she recently had him transfer the family’s home videos 
to DVDs and she is usually watching them when he calls to check on her. Mrs. Tracey rarely 
goes out now, refusing to go to church because she “cannot believe in a god that would do this to 
[her] family.” She reports that she is not interested in spending time with anyone in the group of 
couples because she is just reminded of all the old memories with Mr. Tracey and makes her 
wish he was with her even more than usual. Her son notes that his mother becomes upset during 
all family events from birthdays, holidays, and family dinners to simply picking up her grandson 
from school. She agrees with this report and explains that every day she spends thinking about 
how she wishes Mr. Tracey could be with her. Of note, she repeatedly tells her son during the 
appointment that she will “never get over” his father’s death and cannot understand why doctors 
were not able to revive him again at the hospital.  
 During the interview, Mrs. Tracey is eager to discuss the circumstances of Mr. Tracey’s 
death. She cries throughout the interview, stating that she feels guilty she was not able to make it 
to the hospital in time and that she worries constantly that she could have prevented Mr. Tracey’s 
death if she had urged him to quit smoking and adhere to his doctor’s recommended diet 
changes. She also reported she dreams regularly about trying to get to the hospital and fighting 
with the doctors about why they could not revive Mr. Tracey. Mrs. Tracey notes that while she 
had strong faith before losing Mr. Tracey, she found herself angry with her pastor and offended 
by her church community’s comforting remarks that her husband was “in a better place,” or that, 
“he is with God.” Many members of the church who have reached out to Mrs. Tracey’s son have 
relayed they are surprised she is not feeling back to herself yet. She reports intact appetite and 
slightly increased sleep, which she attributes to “not doing much.” She is not suicidal, but wishes 
she and Mr. Tracey could be together again. She did not report any hallucinations or delusions. 
She reports she continues to care for her dog, Ollie, and leaves the home daily to take him on 
walks around the block.  
 
Additional information: 
Mrs. Tracey and Mr. Tracey were high school sweethearts and had a very difficult time getting 
pregnant. Mrs. Tracey reported having multiple miscarriages before having her only son at age 
 
 67 
32, with Mr. Tracey being her main support during this period of time. She reflects that she 
blamed herself for the miscarriages and when she had her son she was extremely worried about 






Vignette 2 (PGD with non-representative griever) 
 Kimberly is a 19-year-old college student whose freshman year college roommate, 
Brooke, passed away suddenly at the end of their first year. Brooke and Kimberly were both in a 
very competitive program within their college and each had separate circles of friends. 
Nonetheless, they were friendly and spent time together studying and hanging out at their dorm.  
They often ate their meals together and discussed issues they were having adjusting to school. 
However, they spent most of their time with their respective friend groups on weekends and had 
few mutual friends.  
While Kimberly was home one weekend, Brooke presented to student health with a high 
fever, nausea, and muscle aches and was suspected to have a gastrointestinal virus. Over the next 
couple hours she developed a rash, stiff neck pain, headache, and sensitivity to light. An RA 
accompanied her back to student health where she was reevaluated and sent to the emergency 
room. She was diagnosed with bacterial meningitis following a cerebral spinal fluid tap. She died 
in the hospital. Kimberly’s RA and resident director informed her when she returned from home. 
She was not able to participate in any memorial or funeral activities as Brooke’s family had 
services in her hometown, on the other side of the country.  
Kimberly was excused from her final exams and decided to finish her course work from 
home. She ultimately decided to accept grades of “incomplete” after talking with her professors, 
with the understanding that she would turn in outstanding assignments by the first week of fall 
courses. Upon returning home, Kimberly became increasingly preoccupied with Brooke’s 
passing, first talking with her family about it but eventually self isolating and spending much of 
her time online journaling or looking at Brooke’s social media. As friends from home returned 
from school, they expressed their concern that Kimberly seemed to be somewhere else and, 
while trying to be supportive, they were struggling with how to support her as their conversations 
were always circuitous and almost exclusively revolving around how Kimberly could have 
prevented Brooke’s passing. Her mother has begun to worry as Brooke passed away in mid-
March and Kimberly has already been back at school for two months and does not appear to be 
improving. She remains emotionally numb, has not completed her work from last semester, and 
is still having difficulty accepting Brooke’s death.     
Kimberly agrees that she thinks about Brooke often, despite them not being particularly 
close or spending much time together socially during the school year. Kimberly reports still 
feeling like a piece of her is missing and she is worried about if she will be able to complete her 
outstanding work, on top of her assignments for this semester on which she is already falling 
behind. She was having trouble connecting with her friends this summer and her friends from 
school have expressed their concern, telling her that they do not understand why she is having 
such a difficult time accepting Brooke is gone. They report that while they understand Kimberly 
and Brooke were friendly, they do not understand why she is not feeling better, as even Brooke’s 







Vignette 3 (Normative Bereavement) 
 Greg Learly is an 84-year-old man whose twin sister recently passed away about eight 
months ago after contracting pneumonia. Greg and his sister, Allison, lived together after both 
their spouses died in their late seventies. Both siblings remained fairly independent until they 
both decided they would move into an assisted living facility last year when Allison began 
showing signs of age related dementia. Allison and Greg enjoyed a newfound closeness later in 
life and spent most of their time together playing cards, visiting with their grandchildren, bird 
watching, and talking about their lives. Allison became sick with a bad cough that eventually 
developed into pneumonia. When Allison became ill, Greg rarely left her alone for very long, 
continuing to regularly visit her even when she was transferred to a facility nearby with higher 
care capabilities. After about a week at the new facility, Allison was placed on hospice and 
treated with palliative care. Greg was with Allison when she passed away.  
When Allison first passed away, Greg fluctuated between being sad and being in better 
spirits, sometimes wanting to be alone and other times laughing with his grandchildren while 
sharing funny stories about Allison. Greg put together a slide show of photos of his and Allison’s 
families across her life and gave a eulogy at her funeral. He continues to keep photos and 
mementos of Allison’s in his bedroom, sometimes bringing gifts and flowers to her gravesite. He 
recently confided in his eldest daughter that he felt losing Allison was like losing a part of 
himself. They had always been the “Learly twins,” and it was strange to be on this earth without 
her. Greg has kept up with his regular routine as best he can, but staff has seen him sitting alone, 
staring out his window, and crying on days like Allison’s birthday, his wife and his anniversary, 
and holidays. However, he brightens when interacting when others and especially brightens 
when talking about Allison. 
Greg and Allison’s children describe the whole family to be quite close. They are 
protective of Greg and staff relays that they are watchful for changes in personality or behavior. 
Since Allison passed, Greg’s children have encouraged him to keep up with groups of friends 
with whom he and Allison had played cards and gone bird watching. Most days they call and 
Greg has attended regularly scheduled events, however some days he reports feel “low” or 
“glum” and has stayed in his room. 
Staff reports he continues to keep up with all aspects of self-care and remains one of their 
more independent residents. They deny any changes in his appetite or sleep habits, with Greg 
confirming these reports. Overall Greg reports that there are highs and lows. He still thinks of 
Allison and misses her, but also affirms that he still enjoys his day-to-day “puttering” around the 













General Post-Vignette Measure. 
 
1. Make a determination about the most likely diagnosis given the information in the vignette. 
☐ Major Depressive Disorder 
☐ Persistent Depressive Disorder 
☐ Bipolar Disorder 
☐ Cyclothymic Disorder 
☐ Psychotic Disorders 
☐ Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
☐ Panic Disorder 
☐ Specific Phobia 
☐ Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
☐ Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
☐ Acute Stress Disorder 
☐ Adjustment Disorder 
☐ Prolonged Grief Disorder 
☐ Borderline Personality Disorder 
☐ Substance Use Disorder 
☐ Other (please describe): _________________________ 
 
2. Rate the severity of this case using the following sliding scale:  
 
Not at all severe Moderately severe Extremely severe 
0 50 100 
 
3. Rate your confidence in the accuracy of the diagnosis you selected on the following sliding 
scale:  
 
Not at all confident Moderately confident 
Extremely confident, 
absolutely certain 








Post vignette 1. Intervention Group Survey. 
 
1. Select two preliminary diagnoses from the following list. 
☐ Major Depressive Disorder 
☐ Persistent Depressive Disorder 
☐ Bipolar Disorder 
☐ Cyclothymic Disorder 
☐ Psychotic Disorders 
☐ Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
☐ Panic Disorder 
☐ Specific Phobia 
☐ Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
☐ Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
☐ Acute Stress Disorder 
☐ Adjustment Disorder 
☐ Prolonged Grief Disorder 
☐ Borderline Personality Disorder 
☐ Substance Use Disorder 
☐ Other (please describe): _________________________ 
 
2a. Please list reasons for your preliminary diagnosis. 
 
2b. Please list reasons against your preliminary diagnosis. 
 






3a. Please list reasons against your secondary diagnosis. 
 
1. Make a determination about the most likely diagnosis given the information in the vignette. 
☐ Major Depressive Disorder 
☐ Persistent Depressive Disorder 
☐ Bipolar Disorder 
☐ Cyclothymic Disorder 
☐ Psychotic Disorders 
☐ Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
☐ Panic Disorder 
☐ Specific Phobia 
☐ Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
☐ Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
☐ Acute Stress Disorder 
☐ Adjustment Disorder 
☐ Prolonged Grief Disorder 
☐ Borderline Personality Disorder 
☐ Substance Use Disorder 
☐ Other (please describe): _________________________ 
 
2. Rate the severity of this case using the following sliding scale:  
 
Not at all severe Moderately severe Extremely severe 
0 50 100 
 
3. Rate your confidence in the accuracy of the diagnosis you selected on the following sliding 
scale?  
Not at all confident Moderately confident 
Extremely confident, 
absolutely certain 










Post-Survey. Clinician attitudes towards intervention. 
 













































































































7. We would like to know more about your personal experience with grief. Please describe 
any relevant experiences and how those experiences impacted your beliefs about death, 
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